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Context is everything.
Detailed stories on technology startups, business and economic current affairs.
Detailed stories on technology startups, business and economic current affairs.
The e-commerce company’s draft IPO papers avoid addressing the competition and paint an unflattering picture on growth and costs.
Editor's note: Snapdeal is a cautionary tale. Once a formidable No. 2 in the early years of Indian e-commerce, through a series of leadership missteps, costly acquisitions, multiple priorities, investor misalignment and hubris, is now reduced to an also-ran, searching for relevance in a thin slice of retail e-commerce that has been left by Amazon and Walmart-Flipkart. Now, six years after Snapdeal hit a peak valuation of $6.5 billion, it is approaching the public markets at a steep discount. We will not get into the how and why of Snapdeal’s fall from grace. (Read “The bittersweet relevance of Snapdeal 2.0” for more.) Instead, we’re reviewing Snapdeal’s draft IPO prospectus dated 20 December 2021, to see if there is any story that is left to sell. Value in e-commerce The most interesting part and the entire hypothesis of valuing the company is in “Section IV: About our Company - Industry Overview” of Snapdeal’s draft red herring prospectus. It is prefaced with the following remarks: The information contained in this section, unless otherwise specified, is derived from the report titled “Value Retail & eCommerce …
While the filing for an IPO by its telecom and digital business was the highlight, Reliance laid out plans for its new energy and retail businesses, setting them up for eventual listings.
As India’s largest stock exchange heads to the public markets, it may need to rethink its excessive reliance on transaction revenue.
As growth in equities cools, asset managers are looking to embed themselves in payrolls, payments, and credit. This raises their influence, but also the stakes.
